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The Scottish Government is (at the time of writing) piloting through the Scottish Parliament 
the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill. Its 
target is in effect sectarianism. Whatever form any new statute will take, the burden will 
remain with the justice system to decide what sectarianism is. That task will of course fall on 
the overworked fiscals and the lower courts. Given the recent decision by Sheriff Scott 
regarding a prosecution which linked an anti-Israel protest with racism, where he described 
the Crown’s attempt “to squeeze malice and ill-will out of the agreed facts” as “rather 
strained”,1 Crown Office will surely find this unwelcome.  
The higher criminal courts stubbornly buck responsibility for defining either religious or 
racial prejudice. In Walls v Brown, Lord Carloway observed only that there could not be “any 
reasonable comparison” between the Famine Song, God Save the Queen and Flower of 
Scotland because the Famine Song “call[s] upon people native to Scotland to leave the 
country because of their racial origins”.2 In Dyer v Hutchison the offender directed anti-
English abuse against Rangers supporters. It was decided that his conduct “may not have 
been racist in the same way” as that of the two other appellants, who made monkey grunts 
and yelled “you dirty black bastard”.3 It is understandable in such an embattled and 
politicised area of law that both drafters and judges have been tempted to provide as little 
definition as they humanly can. On the other hand, the Scottish appeal courts have rather 
taken the biscuit. 
What would adequately define Scottish sectarianism? Academics agree on one thing: it 
is not predominantly “about religion”. Arguments then begin about what else it is a proxy for 
(racism; tribalism; the hidden injuries of class) and how deep it runs (history; life chances; 
demography). What women contribute, research has not noticed. Perhaps, some say, it might 
                                                 
1 PF v Napier et al (unpublished), Edinburgh Sheriff Court, Sheriff’s Note issued 8 April 
2010. 
2 Walls v Brown [2009] HCJAC 59, 2009 JC 375 at para 19. 
3 Dyer v Hutchison [2006] HCJAC 45, 2006 JC 212 at paras 27, 5 and 8. 
be deemed ethno-religious. But, however plausible that might be as regards some 
“Protestant” offenders, can we really foist an ethno-religious motivation on “Catholic” 
offenders? Whatever, what no-one predicted is this spring’s brutal outbreak of sectarian 
lawlessness related to football. 
 
 
A. SECTARIANISM IN MODERN SCOTLAND 
 
It will not help that football chanting has its own unique and subtle symbols and does not 
depend exclusively on crude abuse. The courts do not often find themselves bamboozled by 
racist thugs wandering through Pollokshields singing a menacing chant worded, say, “I love 
being Scottish”. But in football, laudatory songs – “up the IRA” – are common and must in 
principle be distinguished from express prejudice – “up yours, you Fenian bastards”. 
The underlying problem for the law, however, is that Scottish sectarianism is not a 
unitary phenomenon. Unlike Northern Ireland, Scotland has pockets of football rivalry where 
supporters sing and yell sectarian insults, knowing that these are damaging and are banned, 
but barely grasping the cultural differences from which these originate.4 Perhaps the best 
example of the difference between the two nations is the recent attempt at a legislative 
definition of sectarian in Northern Ireland. The definition of sectarian chanting proposed by 
the NI Human Rights Commission, and accepted by the NI Executive, was that “it consists of 
or includes matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting to a person by reason of that 
person's religious belief or political opinion or against an individual as a member of such a 
group”.5 The definition had cross-party support and failed to become law only because it was 
opposed by the Ulster Unionist Party.  
It is hard to imagine a Scotland today where sectarian belief could be demarcated by 
political loyalty. Indeed religious prejudice, it seems, was not read across to include political 
taunts in one case where football supporters sang songs about the IRA – even though a 
religious aggravation in Scots law can extend even to an offence motivated by malice and ill-
will “against a social or cultural group with a perceived religious affiliation, based on their 
                                                 
4 See e.g. C and R Deuchar, “Territorialities in Scotland: perceptions of young people in 
Glasgow” (2009) 12 Journal of Youth Studies 731 at 740. 
5 Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report, amendment 9, tabled 3 Mar 2011 (emphasis 
added). 
membership of that group”.6 Reference to a political organisation, whatever its meaning in 
the Northern Irish context, could not by itself be seen in Scotland to amount to religious 
prejudice.  
 
Protestant and Catholic Scotland, as Michael Rosie explained in what remains the best 
recent work on the topic,7 is a society marked by bigotry but not systematic discrimination; 
by clashing identities but not by separate worlds; and by spats but not warfare.8 People do not 
vote for Catholicised and Protestanticised political parties. Roman Catholics in Scotland 
today have an even chance of settling down with someone outside their own religion.9 As an 
audience member at a recent Edinburgh University evening debate asked, why are we treating 
football as the symptom and not the disease? 
What is notable about the recent horrific history of assaults and bullets and bombs by 
post is that it is so atypical. The most vulnerable victims in Scotland are the visible ethnic 
minorities, who continue to live in greater poverty, with all the disadvantage that entails, and 
whose experience of criminal victimisation miserably overshadows the anti-Catholic 
experience. Charges with a racial aggravation amount to over 4000 a year, with the great 
majority of victims identified as coming from the tiny proportion of these groups in Scottish 
society.10 Interviews in 2004 with 175 people who had reported racist incidents in the 
Strathclyde region found that more than a third described enduring such incidents so 
frequently, even constantly, that they could not quantify the number involved. The majority 
                                                 
6 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 s 74. See also “Sheriff right to dismiss case against 
man singing IRA songs, says expert”, Scotsman 30 Mar 2011.  
7 M Rosie, The Sectarian Myth in Scotland (2004). 
8 Compare Northern Ireland: House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The 
Challenge of Diversity: Hate Crime in Northern Ireland, Ninth Report of Session 2004–05 
(HL 2004-05, 548-I) vol I para 13. 
9 Currently the best source is C Holligan and G Raab, Inter-Sectarian Couples in the 2001 
Census (Scottish Longitudinal Study Research Working Paper 7, 2010) para 12.  
Note this is less “inter” mixing than a random assortation would create, a point most 
commentators omit to mention. 
10 Scottish Government, Statistical Bulletin: Racist Incidents Recorded by the Police in 
Scotland, 2009-10 (2011) table 8. 2% of the population in the last census identified as “other 
white” and 2.5% placed themselves in the remaining minority categories: see Office of the 
Chief Statistician, Analysis of Ethnicity in the 2001 Census - Summary Report (2004). The 
proportion will have grown since. 
experienced this abuse from different perpetrators, rather than repeat victimisation from a 
single source.11 
Rosie and other social theorists have had insufficient to say, though, about the justified 
apprehension felt by a person who fears they may be identified with the Roman Catholic 
minority. There were 693 charges with a religious aggravation in the most recent annual 
figures released,12 and it is unlikely to be a mere artifice of reporting and recording practices 
that the chances of “Roman Catholicism” being the target were (on the last occasion that the 
count was made public) around twice that of “Protestantism”.13 Meanwhile, much of the 
public debate about separate education seems unable to refrain from openly hostile victim-
blaming based on no credible evidence.  
The problem is not confined to football. There is anti-Catholicism and anti-Irish feeling 
in Scotland, albeit that we struggle even to estimate its prevalence. In particular it is wrong to 
imply by omission that the hostility is the same on both sides. Chants of “Prod” or “Hun” and 
a few breach of the peace convictions do not amount to equivalence. Scots law, however, 
could not successfully distinguish the two phenomena without incurring huge criticism: 
recognising the differences would thus inevitably be left to the fiscals and the courts.  
 
 
B. A CRIMINAL SOLUTION? 
 
So it is in the midst of all this that the SNP government introduced its new Bill. As weary 
practitioners and law lecturers revising their notes will be asking, is it necessary? Would it 
work?  
The Bill, it seems, sets out largely to mortar cracks and create nominate offences.14 The 
cracks are few and there is (for the most part) ample law to cover disorderly or threatening 
behaviour. . Explicit naming of football offences appeals to many, though, and a true gap 
exists in the arena of incitement to religious hatred, because it is an insult to victims to 
                                                 
11 K Goodall, R Choudri, R Barbour and S Hilton, The Policing of Racist Incidents in 
Strathclyde (2004) 10. 
12 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, “Hate crime in Scotland 2010-11” (nd), 
available at http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Hate Crime - publication - final 
version.pdf.  
13 K Doyle, Use of Section 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 – Religiously 
Aggravated Reported Crime: An 18 Month Review (2006) para 3.2.  
14 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill, 
Explanatory Notes, SP Bill 1–EN 1 Session 4 (2011), 11. 
subsume this under religiously aggravated breach of the peace. Defining these is a delicate 
job to take on. The Bill as introduced was far too flawed in either concept or construction to 
be fit for it.  Much amending will be needed, but this could be done. 
The other question however is whether new provisions will work. It has long been 
argued by criminologists that longer sentences do not deter crime and that policymakers do 
not want to know this.15 Governments, however, must be seen to be responsive, and there are 
benefits to be gained from instantiating longer sentence maxima and creating new, named 
offences. Each time sentence enhancement provisions have been introduced in the UK, they 
have been marketed, sometimes primarily, as messages sent to the general public and the 
victims: an expressivist approach. They are sold, too, as a means of bringing about changed 
behaviours. One important function they also carry out is to measure and monitor offences 
where an aggravation has been proven. It is easily forgotten that before the introduction of 
police monitoring of racist incidents in Scotland, commentators were fond of announcing that 
Scots were too busy being sectarian to engage in something as un-Scottish as racism.16 
Records of convictions which include statutory aggravations provide further evidence not just 
that racially aggravated behaviour is alleged, but that it has occurred. 
Nonetheless, more new legislation seems at first sight an expensive and bureaucratic 
way to prove there is a problem. The question therefore is whether a denunciatory message 
has value and whether new legislation might change these presumed sectarian behaviours. 
Again, orthodoxy claims not, but Phyllis Gerstenfeld has cited behavioural studies research 
which concludes that law can influence people to reduce overt prejudice, and that it is 
possible - indeed such an approach is relatively effective – to change attitudes through 
changing their behaviour.17  
The old chestnut that the solution is education, education, education need not be wholly 
rejected, but Gerstenfeld elsewhere suggests that when a “hate” crime is carried out in search 
of a thrill, to gain excitement and social capital, a policy of tackling bigotry in society may 
not be all that productive.18 Notably, of the cases examined in Doyle’s review of the 
operation of section 74, 95% of the convictions were for breach of the peace. Over half were 
specifically recorded as involving alcohol. In 34% of the cases the target was the police, and 
                                                 
15 See especially the special issue (10(1), February 2011) of Criminology and Public Policy.  
16 See e.g. P Dimeo and G Finn, “Scottish Racism, Scottish Identities”, in P Brown (ed), 
Fanatics! Power, Identity, and Fandom in Football (1998). 
17 P B Gerstenfeld, Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls, and Controversies, 2nd edn (2011) 209. 
18 Ibid 279. 
in 45% the target was the community, suggesting disorderly conduct. Only 17% of targets 
were “civilians” (neither police officers nor workers in the leisure industry, transport or 
hospitals).19 
Furthermore, it seems that the public may be more likely to hold favourable views of the 
criminal justice system when they are more informed about patterns of sentencing.20 Even 
just a public discussion which provides more information about sentencing may prove useful. 
It matters that the public feel positive toward the criminal justice system; not least because it 
is they who report crimes and support the prosecution process throughout.21 All in all, the 
evidence is far from conclusive, but we should give new measures a considered hearing. 
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20 J M Gay, “What shapes public opinion of the CJS?” in J Woods and T Gannon (eds), 
Public Opinion and Criminal Justice (2009) 49 at 65;  
21 G Tendayi Viki and Gerd Bohner, “Achieving accurate assessment of the attitudes toward 
the CJS: methodological issues”, in Woods and Gannon (eds), Public Opinion (n 20) 96. 
